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ABSTRACT
Use of social media by political parties has become a part of their communication strategies. In 
Catalonia, where around 20% of Internet users obtain political information through Facebook and 
Twitter, parties use these channels widely. This article has examined 814 posts, 5,772 comments, 
52,470 likes and 25,907 shares from the official Facebook pages of Catalan parties in order to 
ascertain the relevance of the classical party characteristics (party size, level of institutionalization, 
centralization of decision-making, position at the ideological cleavages) on how parties and their 
followers behave on Facebook. The data sustain that the characteristics of Catalan parties have an 
influence on their posting behaviour on Facebook, and mould the reactions (comments, likes and 
shares) of their Facebook followers to these posts. The results further show that small and new parties 
achieve greater engagement than bigger and more institutionalized parties.
KEywORdS
Catalonia, Cleavages, Facebook, Followers, Party Centralization, Parties’ Organization, Political Parties, Posting 
Behaviour
INTROdUCTION
Social media pose a variety of challenges and opportunities to political parties. They1 offer the 
possibility of a level of interaction between parties and the public that was previously absent, and 
give voters the ‘chance of entering into a real online dialogue with representatives’ (Mackay, 2010, 
p. 23), enhance relationship building and allow individual citizens to make, contribute, filter and 
share content (Bechmann & Lomborg, 2012). However, the organizational adaptation of parties to 
these new channels of electronic communication puts participatory pressure on their hierarchical 
structures (Gustafsson, 2012, p. 1,123), blurring their classic strategy, based on a sharp differentiation 
between their members and the public (Margetts, 2001; Löfgren, 2003). In this way, parties combine 
a variety of media channels – from traditional mass media to social media – and are being involved 
in transformations that challenge party centralization and traditional party elites in a communicative 
environment described as a ‘hybrid media system’ (Chadwick, 2013; Karlsen & Enjolras, 2016).
30
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Parties are political actors with primary goals (Harmel & Janda, 1994) and organizational 
characteristics, and behaving strategically to win elections and influence policies. All of these 
determine how they deal with social media, just as what happened with previous online tools such 
as websites, chats and forums (Padró-Solanet & Cardenal 2008; Cardenal, 2011). In brief, parties’ 
adaptation to this new digital environment seems to be mediated by their goals, organization, position 
on the ideological cleavages, power situation and electoral strength.
This article seeks to analyse the behaviour of Catalan parties with seats in the Catalan parliament, 
together with their followers on the party Facebook pages. We consider that party characteristics in 
general and party organization in particular have an influence over interaction on parties’ Facebook 
pages. Specifically, we examine the relationship between parties’ main characteristics, their Facebook 
posting behaviour and the responses given by their Facebook followers to these posts.
The understanding of how parties’ characteristics are affecting party use of social media depends 
on detailed empirical analysis rooted in specific cases and countries (Wall & Sudulich, 2010). The 
Catalan case is an addition from southern Europe to a field where other studies have already focused 
on countries with a proportional electoral system but which are mainly drawn from Northern Europe. 
And it is a particularly suitable case study because of the wide-spread use of the Internet and social 
media, the early adoption of social media by parties, and the multiparty system that provides sufficient 
variability between the analysed characteristics of the parties.
Our period of analysis is not long, between 15 January and 15 February, 2013; it is perhaps prone to 
short term conditions and factors. However, since the volume of data retrieved from parties’ Facebook 
pages is quite high (384 posts, 5,772 comments, 52,470 likes and 25,907 shares) and our research 
considers the entirety of the current Catalan parties, we believe that the time span is sufficient to shed 
light on some of the present controversies concerning social media and parties. Moreover, as far as 
we know, this is the first time that a work aims to study the relation between parties’ characteristics, 
parties’ posting behaviour, and their Facebook followers’ engagement in this so-called new ‘hybrid 
media system’ (Chadwick, 2013).
The following section outlines the literature on parties and Facebook use. Following this, we 
set out the context for the Catalan multiparty system, the current political context, and the Catalan 
public’s use of Facebook during our period of analysis. Next, we give details of the research design 
and the construction of variables, stating the hypotheses to be tested. We then present the analysis 
and findings of the article. Finally, there is the discussion and conclusions on the results, outlining 
potential avenues for future research in this area.
PREVIOUS STUdIES
Since their inception, political parties’ organizations have mutated hand in hand with the changes 
in society unleashed by the appearance of new forms of communication. However, the academic 
controversy regarding parties’ organization and communication was given a boost with the shift 
from Web 1.0 to Web 2.0.
As happened with other previous forms of mass communication, the use parties make of the 
Internet and social media depends on organizational characteristics, ideology and electoral situation. 
Consequently, we will review the literature dealing with party characteristics that influence parties’ 
use of the Internet and social media both from an international perspective and from a Catalan point 
of view.
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Party Characteristics that Influence Parties’ Use of the Internet 
and Social Media: An International Perspective
Several authors have studied the goals, organizational factors and political and institutional environment 
that could have an effect on political parties’ online behaviour (Ward & Gibson, 2000; Römmele, 
2003; Gibson & Römmele, 2003; Chadwick & Anstead, 2009; Sudulich, 2009; Wall & Sudulich, 2011; 
Gibson, 2015). Most of these studies are inspired in the classic literature that understands parties as 
actors with their own goals and organizational characteristics, constrained by the institutional and 
political context (Janda, 1980; Ström, 1990; Deschouwer, 1992; Harmel & Janda, 1994).
Römmele (2003) was one of the first to point out that parties’ use of ICTs will not be uniform and 
will depend on their goals and objectives. She elaborated a classification of parties’ adaptation to ICTs 
based on the link between their primary goals (maximize votes, implement policies, promote internal 
democracy and seek office) and their online behaviour (communication strategy, target audience and 
message). According to her, parties which focus on maximizing their votes and seeking office will 
adopt a top-down communication strategy, whereas those seeking to implement policies and increase 
their internal democracy will develop bottom-up and participatory communication strategies. The 
former goals and communication strategy would correspond to catch-all and cartel parties and the 
later would be related to mass parties (Römmele, 2003, p. 14).
In addition, one of the most important factors affecting parties’ behaviour both online and offline 
is the level of centralization. Wall & Sudulich’s (2010) analysis of Irish political parties assessed the 
effects of their degree of centralization on their online behaviour. The dependent variable of the study 
was the extent of interactive content on parties’ websites, and the independent variables comprised 
five dimensions: (1) nationalization of structure, (2) selection of the party leader, (3) selection of the 
parliamentary candidates, (4) formulation of party policies, (5) administration of discipline. These 
were derived from Janda’s (1980) index of centralization of decisions (Wall & Sudulich, 2011, 
p. 579). The research discovered that centralized and hierarchically organized parties developed 
fewer opportunities for online interaction on their webpages than parties with less centralized and 
hierarchical organizations.
More recently, Vaccari (2013) aimed to explain the relation between parties’ characteristics 
(incumbency, ideology and organization) and their online presence, mainly in party and candidates’ 
websites. His data for parties and candidates from Australia, France, Italy, Spain, United Kingdom 
and the United States provided evidence to refute Karpf’s ‘outparty innovation incentives’ theory 
(Karpf, 2012) which states that parties out of power will have more incentives to adopt and use new 
technologies than parties in power. Vaccari’s findings showed that for the countries mentioned above, 
incumbents outperformed challengers by about two points in the information index of their webpages 
and one point in the participation and delivery dimensions, with these differences being statistically 
significant (Vaccari, 2013, p.103). Furthermore, Vaccari’s results demonstrated that the webpages of 
left-wing parties ‘offered a greater number of engagement opportunities and informative contents’ 
compared to those of the right-wing parties (Vaccari, 2013, p. 108). One of the reasons raised by 
Vaccari to explain the differences between the online behaviour of the left-wing parties and right-
wing parties was their organizational culture, i.e. left-wing and green parties are based on grass-roots 
organizations and therefore they seem to be ‘particularly at ease with the decentralizing affordances 
offered by the Internet’ (Vaccari, 2013, p. 108).
It was the advent of Web 2.0 (O’Reilly, 2005), however, that opened a new dimension in the 
possibilities offered by ICTs to political parties and their representatives. The changing role of the 
citizenry and non-elites from political information consumers to political information co-producers 
(Copeland & Römmele, 2014) blurred the organizational capacity of parties to control the one-
way information flows which characterized Web 1.0, thereby triggering multiple and unexpected 
consequences on parties’ relations with their members and voters (Chadwick, 2013). These factors 
(together with Barack’s Obama use of social media in the 2008 presidential campaign – see Karlsen, 
2012) triggered a flood of research aiming to understand the new environment of ‘social media politics’.
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Lynch and Hogan’s study was one of the first attempts to understand the effects of social media in 
political parties. It revealed an interesting dichotomy: while no Irish party regarded social networks as 
better than traditional communication methods (Lynch & Hogan, 2012, p. 92), the young participants 
in the study felt social network sites should form part of a party’s overarching communications strategy 
(Lynch & Hogan, 2012, p. 95). From a political participation perspective, Gustafsson (2012) studied 
the characteristics of Swedish social media users and their participation around parties. His main 
concern was to analyse the effect of social media on political parties’ hierarchies and he discovered that 
social networking sites had eroded internal hierarchies as ‘collaboration across local party branches 
had been made easier. As information no longer had to go through central boards, informal networks 
were perceived as easier to form and maintain’ (Gustafsson, 2012, p. 1,117).
In their research of Danish politics, Skovsgaard & Van Dalen (2013) found that politicians used 
Twitter and Facebook to strengthen their position in intraparty competition, and that communicating 
directly with voters was a key motivation for being active on social media. Moreover, Klinger’s study 
of Swiss parties’ behaviour on Facebook and Twitter showed that during the 2011 Swiss election, 
small parties did not benefit from the potential offered by social media, whereas the dominant parties 
with larger number of voters gained more resonance online and were better able to facilitate reciprocal 
activity on Facebook (Klinger, 2013, p. 731).
In the case of Norway, Larsson’s (2014) comparison of the political actors’ use of Facebook 
pages in Norway and Sweden discovered that minor parties ‘were not only comparably more ardent 
in posting to their Facebook Pages – it would also appear that they succeeded in gaining online 
support as their posts were shared and liked at levels sometimes corresponding to the spread enjoyed 
by more established parties’ (Larsson, 2014, p. 14). In this same regard, Kalsnes’ (2016) analysis 
of the interaction strategy and online responsiveness – using semi-structured interviews and data 
from parties’ Facebook pages – of three major and two minor Norwegian parties during the 2013 
elections showed that minor parties were comparatively more interactive (in percentage of the total 
number of comments) than major parties. Moreover, his in-depth interviews indicated the parties’ 
awareness of the relation between the type of content of their Facebook posts and the engagement 
that this content might trigger. As stated, for example, by the political communication director of the 
Norwegian Labour Party ‘images and videos are mentioned as material particularly well-suited to 
publishing on Facebook to engage and encourage sharing’ (Kalsnes, 2016, p. 5).
Lastly, another promising line of research was the one initiated by Gibson (2015), in which she 
studied ‘citizen-initiated campaigns’. These are online campaigns launched by party supporters (who 
are not necessarily members of these organizations) that use the web tools created by the parties or 
the candidates’ teams (Gibson, 2015, p. 5). The Facebook and Twitter accounts of either the parties 
or their supporters are crucial elements in these campaigns.
Party Characteristics that Influence Parties’ Use of the 
Internet and Social Media: A Catalan Perspective
Some research has also been conducted on the Catalan parties and their representatives’ behaviour 
in Web 1.0 and Web 2.0 communication environments, yet in comparison to other countries this 
research has been limited.
Padró-Solanet & Cardenal (2008) and Cardenal (2011) studied how Catalan parties’ characteristics 
influenced the interactive and participatory features that they offered in their webpages. They showed 
that in the specific case of Catalan and Spanish political parties, their internal characteristics and 
their position in the electoral market structured the interactive and participatory channels that parties 
offered on their webpages. They also discovered that big parties (above all when they are in opposition) 
tended to open more communication and participatory channels on their webpages (Cardenal, 2011, 
p. 95). By the same token, parties that were less ideologically coherent and had small organizations 
tended to develop more horizontal channels of participation and communication (Ibidem). This fact 
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triggered a far greater development of channels to support the party or activate its networks of contacts 
(Cardenal, 2011, pp. 96-97; Padró-Solanet & Cardenal, 2008, p. 57-58).
Following this line of research, ‘Authors removed’ (2013) conducted an exploratory study to shed 
light on the relation between Catalan parties’ centralization of decisions (CiU, ERC and PSC) and the 
participatory and interactional features offered by these parties in their websites and Facebook pages. 
Specifically, we wanted to uncover possible differences between the behaviour of parties in Web 1.0 
and Web 2.0. The results showed that the degree of centralization of decision making for the three 
parties was high, and that there were no significant differences in terms of the participatory features 
offered by these parties in their webpages. Moreover, interaction on Catalan parties’ Facebook pages 
appeared to depend much more on the predominant issues of the Catalan agenda than on the level of 
centralization of their decision making.
A more recent work studying Catalan parties and their representatives’ behaviour on Facebook 
and Twitter conducted by ‘Author removed’ (2015) corroborated previous results found by Larsson 
(2015) in Norway and Sweden, and Kalsnes (2016) in Norway, which provided evidence of the fact that 
minor parties were comparatively more interactive on Web 2.0 than major parties. Additionally, this 
research (Author removed, 2015) pointed to Catalan parties’ difficulties in adapting their organizations 
to the social media environment and in understanding the new participation and engagement logics 
triggered by Web 2.0.
Last, it is important to note that when analysing the online behaviour of Catalan parties, scholars 
(Serrano, 2007; Bartomeus & Medina, 2010; Padró-Solanet & Cardenal, 2008; ‘Author removed’, 
2013) pinpoint the necessity of considering their position on the cleavage structure of the Catalan 
party system which is divided between the Left-/Right-wing and non-Catalan-nationalist/Catalan 
nationalist cleavages.
POLITICAL ANd TECHNOLOGICAL CONTEXTS: THE CATALAN CASE
Catalonia has interesting traits for this study such as the wide use of the Internet and social media, 
the variety of parties represented in the Catalan Parliament and a conflictual political environment 
that is being reflected and expanded by social media.
The Political Context
The elections to the Catalan Parliament in November 2012 were exceptional elections. Following 
the massive protest march in Barcelona on 11 September 2012 in favour of the independence of 
Catalonia, the Catalan Prime Minister Artur Mas dissolved Parliament on 28 September 2012 and 
called elections for 25 November 2012. These elections were characterized by the discussions on 
Catalonia’s right to hold a referendum on independence or to become an independent state and the 
effects of the economic crisis and the expenditure cuts implemented by the Catalan government.
Participation in the elections was up by almost 10 percentage points with respect to the 2010 
elections (from 60% in 2010 to 69.6% in 2012), and Artur Mas and his party CiU won the elections 
again, achieving more than 1 million votes and 50 seats in the Catalan Parliament. They, however, 
lost an important share of votes and seats, while other more radical pro-independence parties such 
as ERC and CUP achieved a huge increase in terms of votes and seats (400,850 votes and 24 seats 
in total). In fact, CUP entered the Catalan Parliament for the first time. At the beginning of 2013, 
Catalan public support for the independence of Catalonia extended to half of the population (46.4% 
of respondents were in favour) (CEO, 2013).
Figure 1 shows the distribution of the Catalan parties along the two main ideological cleavages 
(Left-Right wing and Non-Catalan nationalist/Catalan Nationalist) after the 2012 elections.
CiU stands for ‘Convergencia i Unio’ and is a centre-right Catalan nationalist party. PSC is the 
Socialist Party of Catalonia, which in the 2012 elections got 20 seats. ERC stands for Republican 
Left of Catalonia and it is a left-wing pro-independence party and in 2012 it won 21 seats. C’s stands 
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for ‘Citizens’ and it is a centrist party opposed to Catalan nationalism, which won 9 seats. PP is the 
Popular Party of Catalonia, a right-wing and Spanish nationalist party with 19 seats. ICV-EUiA is a 
left-wing party self-defined as eco-socialist, which won 13 seats. And CUP stands for ‘Candidacies 
of Popular Unity’, it is an extreme left and pro-independence coalition and in the 2012 election they 
won 3 seats in Parliament.
After the November elections, several political events shaped the Catalan political agenda 
and developed through our period of analysis. First, on 19 December 2012, CiU and ERC signed 
the ‘Agreement for the National Transition and the Guarantee of Parliamentary Stability for the 
Government of Catalonia’. Second, on 23 January 2013, the Catalan Parliament passed ‘Resolution 
5/X approving the Declaration of Sovereignty and the Right of the People of Catalonia to Decide’. 
Lastly, the political agenda of our period of analysis was marked by two corruption scandals: the 
Barcenas affair (illegal financing of the PP at Spanish level) and the Camarga affair (illegal recordings 
at the Catalan level). The CEO survey of 14 February, and previous analysis of the parties’ Facebook 
pages showed that these events were being reflected into public opinion, as well as concern about the 
economic readjustments and crisis in Catalonia (‘Author removed’, 2013).
The Technological Context
Catalonia is the second Autonomous Community of Spain in terms of Facebook users (3,448,980), just 
behind Madrid (Bluemarket, 2013). In terms of age and gender characteristics of Catalan Facebook 
users, many of them (734,140) are concentrated in the 18–24 age band in which there is a slight 
predominance of men (389,500) over women (344,640) (Ibidem). Taking Facebook and Twitter 
together, 68% of the Internet users participate in these social media (Fundación Telefónica, 2014, 
p.138). By 2009 (five years after Facebook’s launch in 2004) most of the Catalan political parties 
had launched their Facebook pages.
With respect to the way that the Catalan public obtains political information, according to figures 
from the CEO survey on 13 June 2013, in our period of study social media were used to obtain political 
information by 18.3% of respondents.
Figure 1. The position of the Catalan parties on the Catalan political cleavages according to the CEO respondents
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Table 1 shows the different platforms used by Catalan voters (for each of the parties with seats 
in the Catalan Parliament) in terms of the mass media and the Internet.
Television is still the predominant platform used by voters of all parties to obtain political 
information. Newspapers come in second place and radio is used by voters for all parties in a similar 
way. However, the biggest differences emerge amongst party voters when it comes to the Internet: 
while CUP (71.7%) and ICV-EUIA (55.2%) voters come highest, PP (22.1%) and PSC (24.8%) voters 
come lowest; CiU (39.6%), ERC (49.5%) and C’s (42.1%) voters are at similar levels. Lastly, in terms 
of social media, the most interesting aspect is the high levels reached by ERC (21.1%), ICV-EUiA 
(26.2%) and CUP (25.3%) in comparison with the other parties.
RESEARCH dESIGN ANd HyPOTHESES
This study seeks to measure to what extent parties’ characteristics affect the way in which Facebook 
is used by political parties and their Facebook followers. We will analyse five standard party 
characteristics drawn from the literature explained in previous sections, having been proven successful 
in explaining online party behaviour: party size, institutionalization, centralization of decisions, left-
right ideology and national identification. The dependent variables are parties’ posting behaviour 
(measured by the number of posts yielded by parties and the number of comments deleted by parties) 
and followers’ engagement (measured by the number of posts, likes and shares).
The first hypothesis that we will test is related to party size. As we have shown in the literature 
review section, previous works (Padró-Solanet & Cardenal, 2008) on Catalan parties’ websites 
have pointed out that big parties have more economic and human resources to use in their online 
activities than small parties. In Switzerland, larger and more dominant parties have more followers 
on Facebook than smaller parties (Klinger, 2013). However, more recent studies indicate that minor 
parties in Norway and Sweden were more interactive than major parties (Larsson, 2014; Kalsnes, 
2016). These contradictory results are probably due, apart from the countries’ particularities, to the 
different timing of the studies: the data for the latter studies are from 2013 but the former are from 
2007 (Catalan parties’ webpages) and 2011 (Switzerland). In that period of time, minor parties could 
have caught up with more established and resource-rich parties following the so-called equalization 
processes in the use of ICTs (Margolis & Resnick, 2000; Strandberg, 2013). Thus, the following 
hypothesis is proposed:
H1: Both party posting activity and followers’ engagement will be higher for medium-size and small 
Catalan parties than for the big parties and semi-big parties.

















Television 93.5 88.5 88.1 88.9 76.5 87.9 64.1
Radio 44.8 46.1 52.4 46.2 49.3 40.3 38.3
Newspapers 48.5 66.0 66.9 48.2 68.9 65.5 58.8
Internet 22.1 39.6 49.5 24.8 55.4 42.1 71.7
Friends, relatives and acquaintances 26.6 43.6 49.9 41 45.8 44.7 54.3
Social Network Sites (Facebook 
and Twitter) 14.7 11.1 21.1 10 26.2 10.4 25.3
Source: First round of the CEO surveys (22 February 2013); N = 2000 (Weighted base)
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Related to party size, our research will test the role played by parties’ level of institutionalization in 
their behaviour on Facebook. Findings in the literature show diverse results; while in the Catalan online 
political scenario less institutionalized parties developed more interactive and participatory features 
in their websites than the institutionalized parties (Cardenal, 2011), in the context of Switzerland 
institutionalized parties developed more reciprocity on Facebook than less institutionalized parties 
(Klinger, 2013). We therefore propose the following hypothesis:
H2: The less-institutionalized Catalan parties’ posting activity and Facebook followers’ engagement 
will be higher than the posting activity and Facebook followers’ engagement of the institutionalized 
Catalan parties.
Previous works in this field have also stated the relevance of parties’ centralization of decisions 
in explaining parties’ online behaviour. More precisely, the findings of Padró-Solanet & Cardenal 
(2008) in the Catalan party system, and those of Wall and Sudulich (2010) in the Irish political context 
revealed that centralized and hierarchically organized parties did not develop as much interactive 
and participatory features in their websites as decentralized parties. Consequently, given the relation 
between parties’ centralization of decisions and their online interactive behaviour we propose the 
following hypothesis:
H3: The Catalan parties’ degree of centralization will influence both the control that they exert over 
their Facebook pages and their Facebook followers’ level of engagement, that means, the more 
centralized the party is, the more comments the party will delete and the less committed their 
Facebook followers will behave.
In the particular case of Catalonia, the Catalan parties’ position on the two cleavages of the 
Catalan party system (Left/Right and non-Catalan-nationalist/Catalan nationalist) has also been 
considered a factor of their online and offline behaviour (Serrano, 2007; ‘Author removed’, 2013; 
‘Author removed’, 2015). Also, research findings have pointed out that mass parties carrying out 
participatory communication strategies (Römmele, 2003) and left-wing parties (Vaccari, 2013) are 
more open to facilitating online interaction in their webpages than cartel parties carrying out top-down 
communication strategies and right-wing parties. Moreover, the independence claims and economic 
crises related factors shaping the current Catalan political agenda seem to be reinforcing the role 
played by the Catalan cleavages in determining Catalan parties’ online behaviour. Consequently, we 
propose the following hypotheses:
H4: Left-wing Catalan parties will have a higher posting activity and more Facebook followers’ 
engagement and will delete fewer comments than right-wing Catalan parties.
H5: Catalan-nationalist parties will have a higher posting activity and more Facebook followers’ 
engagement and will delete fewer comments than non-Catalan-nationalist parties.
To test these hypotheses empirically we will first measure the main characteristics of the Catalan 
political parties. Following the research conducted by Padró-Solanet & Cardenal (2008) and Cardenal 
(2011) we will examine: (a) The size of the party2; (b) The party’s ideology3; and (c) The party’s 
institutionalization4. However, in our study we have added one more characteristic to Padró-Solanet 
and Cardenal’s research: (d) Party’s position on the national identification axis. Finally, we will 
measure the (e) Centralization of party organizations by adopting a coding scheme based on K. Janda’s 
(1980) measure of the centralization of decision, and inspiring on the analysis already carried out by 
Lundell (2004) and Wall & Sudulich (2010). We will use a standardized index made of the original 
8 dimensions figured out by Janda (1980), that ranges from 1 (total centralization of decisions) to 0 
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(total decentralization). Party statutes shown in parties’ websites during the period of analysis have 
been examined to ascertain the position of the parties in each dimension. The 8 dimensions are: 1) 
Nationalization of the structure; 2) Selecting the leader of the party; 3) Selection of the parliamentary 
candidates; 4) Funding distribution; 5) Formulation of the policies; 6) Control of the communications; 
7) Administration of the discipline and 8) Leadership concentration.
With relation to the dependent variables, we will extract from parties’ Facebook pages all the 
parties’ posts and followers’ responses from 15 January to 15 February, 2013. To do so, we will use 
the Netvizz application. Then we will process this data with the Gephi program. We will tackle parties’ 
Facebook posting behaviour by analysing the following dimensions: (a) The total number of posts 
published by the Catalan parties; (b) Their daily average of posts published; (c) The characteristics 
of their posts (text only, text with video or links, or text with photos); (d) The total number of deleted 
comments divided by the total number of comments posted on Facebook by the Catalan political 
parties. From these four dimensions, hypotheses are focused mainly on explaining party factors 
affecting the total number of posts published and deleted by the parties. The analysis of the other two 
dimensions will help to nuance or complete the results of the hypotheses testing.
Facebook followers’ posting responses will be examined by looking at: (a) The total number 
of comments by the parties’ Facebook followers on their Facebook posts; (b) The total number of 
likes by the parties’ Facebook followers’ to their Facebook posts; (c) The total number of likes to the 
Facebook followers’ comments; (d) The total number of shares of the parties’ Facebook posts; and 
(e) The engagement (likes + comments + shares) generated by the parties’ Facebook posts. This last 
joint dimension is the one analysed in the hypotheses.
Regarding the methods that will be used in the hypotheses testing, the small N of this kind of 
studies (limited number of parties in every country, cf. Wall & Sudulich, 2010; Padró-Solanet & 
Cardenal, 2008) does not recommend to undertake parametric statistical analysis, so we rely on 
visual description and non-parametric statistics. First, graphics and data visualizations will be used 
to ascertain the direction of the relationships stated in the hypotheses. In the case of the numeric 
explanatory variables (party size, centralization, Catalan/non-Catalan cleavage, left-right ideology) 
their influence on the dependent variables will be visualized by displaying bar graphs for each 
hypothesis. The dependent variables (total posts, comments deleted and level of engagement) will 
be transformed into standardized values to display them altogether in the graphics. Then, we will 
calculate bivariate coefficients of association between the variables and conduct an analysis of 
variance. Two non-parametric coefficients will be employed – Kendall’s tau and Spearman’s rho – to 
examine the bivariate association between each of the four numeric explanatory variables and the 
three dependent variables.
ANALySES ANd FINdINGS
We first provide the values of the five explanatory variables (party size, institutionalization, 
centralization, Catalan nationalist/non-Catalan-nationalist cleavage and left-right ideology) that are 
included in our hypotheses and show Catalan parties and their Facebook followers’ posting behaviour 
on Facebook. Then we test our hypotheses.
Explanatory and dependent Variables
Table 2 shows the five main characteristics of the political parties with seats in the Catalan Parliament.
After the 2012 election, there was only one big party (CiU), two semi-big parties (ERC and PSC), 
two medium-size parties (PP and ICV-EUIA) and two small parties (C’s and CUP). Five out of seven 
parties fell into the category of institutionalized parties (ERC, CiU, PSC, PP and ICV-EUIA), while 
C’s and CUP are new parties. In terms of party ideology, Catalan political parties span a wide range 
from left to right, with respondents of the representative CEO survey rating Catalan parties from 
2.26 (ERC) to 6.2 (PP). When it comes to the parties’ degree of centralization of decisions, Table 2 
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shows that there are three groups of parties: (a) Decentralized parties (CUP = 0.48; ICV-EUIA = 
0.68); Semi-centralized parties (ERC = 0.7; C’s = 0.75; PSC = 0.77); and Highly-centralized parties 
(CiU = 0.81; PP = 0.81). Lastly, the positioning of the Catalan parties on the national identification 
axis shows four Catalan (ERC = 4.61; CiU = 4.31; CUP = 4.21; ICV-EUIA = 3.86) and two Spanish 
(PP = 1.51; C’s = 2.09) aligned parties. The PSC ranks in a middle position on this political axis 
(PSC = 2.69).
Data for the dependent variables stated in the hypotheses (posting activity or number of posts 
by parties, number of comments deleted by parties, and followers’ engagement) is presented in Table 
3 and Table 4.
Table 3 shows that ICV-EUIA and PSC have a higher posting activity (total posts and posting 
daily average) than CUP, CiU, C’s and PP, while ERC and CiU reach almost the same activity level. 
Our data also point to a clear difference in posting style between CiU and CUP (99% of posts with a 
photo in the case of CiU and 47.85% in the case of CUP), and the rest of the parties (which mainly 
use posts with videos or links or text). And, in terms of deletion of comments our results show that 
PP has the highest figure (93.29%) followed by CiU (31.4%) and PSC (11.93%).
Table 2. Characteristics of Catalan parties with seats in the Catalan Parliament








Position on the National 
Identification Axis 
(0-5)**
PP Medium-Size (19) Institutionalized 6.2 0.81 1.51
CiU Major (50) Institutionalized 4.82 0.81 4.31
ERC Semi-Big (21) Institutionalized 2.26 0.70 4.72




Size (13) Institutionalized 2.3 0.68 3.86
C’S Minor (9) New 5.42 0.75 2.09
CUP Minor (3) New 2.6 0.48 4.21
* Mean from total survey respondents, 0 = extreme left to 7 = extreme right. CEO survey of 20 June. N = 2000.
** Mean from total survey respondents, 0 = only Spanish to 5 = only Catalan. CEO survey of 20 June. N = 2000.
Table 3. Summary table of the Catalan political parties’ posting behavior
Parties Total Posts Post/Day Post+Video or Link/Total (%)
Post+Photo/
Total (%)
Comments Deleted by the Party (% 
Total Comments of Party)
PP 52 1.48 99 1 93.29
CiU 48 1.51 1 99 31.40
ERC 47 1.51 84.70 15.,30 5
PSC 71 2.29 92 8 11.93
ICV-EUIA 77 2.48 72 28 4.10
C’S 35 1.2 82.61 17.39 5.3
CUP 54 1.74 52.15 47.85 2.2
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Lastly, Table 4 presents the interactive features of the posting behaviour of the Facebook followers. 
This table shows the low level of comments posted by the followers of ICV-EUIA-EUiA (218) and 
the high level of comments from the followers of C’s (1,058) and CUP (1,071). On the total number 
of likes of the Catalan parties’ Facebook posts, CUP (24,194) leads here, followed by ERC (8,051). 
The last party in this dimension is PP (769). Regarding the followers’ likes of the comments posted 
by other followers, our data shows that CUP (4,126) and C’s (1,585) Facebook followers feel more 
enthusiastic about liking other followers’ comments compared with the Facebook followers of the 
other parties. In terms of sharing the posts, CUP (9,830), ICV-EUIA (5,123) and ERC (5,096) show 
high levels. And, concerning the total engagement (i.e. the sum of comments, likes and shares), 
again CUP displays a level markedly different from other parties (39,851), while PP has the lowest 
engagement (1,824); C’s, CiU and ERC could be placed in a middle range, while PSC comes only 
sixth out of the seven parties (3,822).
Hypotheses Testing
Our analyses corroborate the first hypothesis (H1: Both party posting activity and followers’ 
engagement will be higher for medium-size and small Catalan parties than for big parties and semi-
big parties). Figure 2 shows, in this regard, that the smallest party (CUP) stands out in achieving 
engagement and one medium-size party (ICV-EUiA) and only one semi-big party (PSC) stands out 
in number of posts. The other semi-big party (ERC) and the biggest party (CiU) are below the mean 
in terms of number of posts. In addition, Table 5 shows that the Kendall’s tau and the Spearman’s 
rho between number of posts and party size are negative, below 4 and non-significant.
The results of our analyses partially corroborate our second hypothesis (H2: The less-
institutionalized Catalan parties’ posting activity and Facebook followers’ engagement will be higher 
than the posting activity and Facebook followers’ engagement of the institutionalized Catalan parties). 
We have examined the differences in means between the two groups of parties (institutionalized 
and non-institutionalized parties – see Table 2) and we can only corroborate H2 for the case of the 
followers’ engagement which is much higher in the case of new parties (25,950 comments, likes and 
shares) than in the case of institutionalized parties (7,834 comments, likes and shares). In contrast, 
the mean number of posts is lower in the case of new Catalan parties (44.5) than in the case of 
institutionalized parties (59).
Our data supports the third hypothesis of this study (H3: The Catalan parties’ degree of 
centralization will influence both the control that they exert over their Facebook pages and their 
Facebook followers’ level of engagement, that means, the more centralized the party is, the more 
comments the party will delete and the less committed their Facebook followers will behave). Figure 
3 shows that the most centralized parties, such as PP and CiU, delete more comments, and their 
Table 4. Features of the behavior of the Catalan parties’ Facebook followers’ engagement
Parties Total Comments Total Likes Comment Likes Total Shares Engagement
PP 923 769 11 121 1,824
CiU 629 6,831 319 2,509 10,287
ERC 531 8,051 366 5,096 14,044
PSC 662 2,094 521 545 3,822
ICV-EUIA 218 3,718 136 5,123 9,195
C’S 1,058 6,813 1,585 2,593 12,049
CUP 1,701 24,194 4,126 9,830 39,851
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followers’ level of engagement is below the mean. Conversely, the most decentralized party (CUP) 
has the highest level of engagement and deletes the least comments.
In addition, the bivariate coefficients (Table 5) show a strong and positive association between 
the parties’ level of centralization and comments deleted, over 0.9 and statistically significant for both 
Kendall’s tau and Spearman’s rho. And, it also indicates a negative association between centralization 
and followers’ engagement, over 0.5 and significant for the Kendall’s tau.
We also wanted to know the relation between parties’ ideology (left-right) and their posting 
behaviour as well as the engagement of their Facebook followers on these posts (H4: Left-wing 
Catalan parties will have a higher posting activity and more Facebook followers’ engagement and 
Figure 2. Number of posts and level of engagement by party size
Table 5. Non-parametric coefficients of bivariate associations: Kendall’s tau (first row) and Spearman’s rank correlation 
coefficient (second row)
Party Size Centralisation Catalan/Spanish Left-Right
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will delete fewer comments than right-wing Catalan parties). Our data (Figure 4) shows that left-wing 
parties stand out in the number of posts initiated by the party whereas right-wing parties post much 
less and delete more comments. In terms of engagement, two left-wing parties – CUP and ERC – are 
clearly above the mean.
The measures of association between the left-right positioning and percentage of comments 
deleted are positive, above 0.4 and the Spearman’s rho is significant, demonstrating that the more 
right-wing a party is, the more comments it will delete (see Table 5). Furthermore, the bivariate 
association with the level of engagement (negative, and the Spearman’s rho is over 0.5) allows us 
to conclude that the more left-wing a party is the more engagement it will have from its followers.
In terms of the fifth hypothesis (H5: Catalan-nationalist parties will have a higher posting 
activity and more Facebook followers’ engagement and will delete fewer comments than non-Catalan-
nationalist parties), Figure 5 indicates a mixed picture. The Catalan-nationalist parties (ERC, CUP) 
stand out in level of engagement, but less-Catalan-nationalist parties are prominent in number of 
posts (ICV-EUiA, PSC). With relation to the comments deleted, the most non-Catalan-nationalist 
party – PP – deletes the highest number of comments from the followers, but an important Catalan-
nationalist party – CiU – ranks in second position in this regard.
The bivariate coefficients (see Table 5) are over 0.4 for the comments deleted and the followers’ 
engagement, but the relationship is very weak in the case of the number of posts initiated by the party. 
The sign of the coefficients indicates that the non-Catalan-nationalist parties delete more comments, 
but get much less engagement from their followers.
We have also checked the relationship between the number of posts initiated by the party and 
the engagement level of the Facebook followers. We wanted to ascertain if the number of updates 
and news posted by the parties could give rise to more comments, likes and shares by the followers. 
But this relationship is not proved since the coefficients of association are low and not significant 
(Kendall’s tau = -0.2381; Spearman’s rho = -0.3929; Pearson’s r = -0.18). Studies from other countries 
Figure 3. Number of comments deleted and level of engagement by degree of centralisation
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Figure 4. Number of posts, comments deleted and level of engagement by left-right ideology cleavage
Figure 5. Number of posts, comments deleted and level of engagement by positioning in the Catalan/Spanish cleavage
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show the same results (Klinger, 2013, p. 729); it seems that posting more does not necessarily imply 
more response from the followers. We should consider that the party with more posting activity – 
PSC – has the lowest level of engagement. Thus, followers do not necessarily interact and response 
more if parties update and post more.
Summarizing, three hypotheses are fully confirmed and two are partially corroborated. In Figure 
6 we graphically show these results using a biplot displaying a two-dimensional plot of the parties 
and their relative positions on the three dependent variables (number of posts, number of comments 
deleted, level of engagement) represented in arrows.
As we can see, CUP and ERC load mainly in the ‘Engagement’ variable, PP and CiU in the 
‘CommentsDeleted’ variable and ICV-EUIA and PSC in the ‘TotalPost’ dimension. Ciutadans (C’s) 
appears in an equidistant location with respect to other parties, but closer to the engagement variable 
where CUP and ERC load heavily because C’s is the third Catalan party in level of engagement.
Nevertheless, as we have mentioned in the previous studies section, alternative variables might 
also be important in determining the level of followers’ engagement. For instance, the different 
marketing strategies of parties might increase the engagement in their Facebook pages (Kalsnes, 
2016). Data in Table 3 show that parties differ in their posting style: CiU and CUP mainly use posts 
with photos while the rest use more videos or links. Hence, we have checked if posting style has 
an influence over the level of engagement by conducting an analysis of variance. And this analysis 
concluded that there is a statistically significant difference between the four types of posts – link, text, 
photo and video – (F(3.81) = 122,579, p = 0.000). Furthermore, the tests revealed that the difference 
between posts with photos and posts with video are not as large as the difference between all the 
other types of posts5. These results suggest that visual posts (posts with photos and videos) achieve 
higher engagement than posts with links or text. The highest difference was observed between the 
posts with photos and the posts with only text.
Figure 6. Party position in the three main traits of parties’ Facebook pages
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dISCUSSION
This research has discovered that parties’ characteristics have an influence over their posting behaviour 
on Facebook and their followers’ reactions to these posts. When analysing parties’ behaviour in Web 
2.0, party organization still matters.
The first hypothesis has been accepted since small parties such as CUP and C’s have more 
engaged and committed Facebook followers, although a semi-big party such as ERC shows a very 
high level of engagement as well. And, PSC (semi-big party) and ICV-EUiA(medium-size party) 
are the parties with the highest number of posts. The second hypothesis is only corroborated for the 
case of the followers’ activity since the less institutionalized parties (CUP and C’s) are among the 
most active (comments, likes and shares) in terms of Facebook followers, but two institutionalized 
parties (PSC and ICV-EUiA) have more posting activity than the new parties.
The testing of these two hypotheses demonstrates that in the Catalan case small, medium-size 
and new parties are taking advantage of social media because they get greater engagement than bigger 
parties. Also a medium-size party (ICV-EUIA) stands out in the number of posts displayed. Although 
these smaller and newer parties do not have the human and material resources of the more consolidated 
and bigger parties, they are surpassing the more established parties since social media are not so costly 
and difficult to dominate as traditional media. These results are in line with those found by Vaccari 
(2013), Larsson (2014) and Kalsnes (2016) in such diverse countries as Italy, France, Sweden and 
Norway. Therefore, we can state that Catalonia is an example of how the online environment can 
favour minor (CUP, C’s), medium-size (ICV-EUiA) or semi-big (ERC) and less-institutionalized 
parties (CUP, C’s). The majority of the voters of these parties obtain political information from the 
Internet and more than 20% from Facebook and Twitter (see Table 1). As other studies have shown 
(Balcells & Cardenal, 2013), the Internet might be levelling the electoral competition in Catalonia 
offering fringe parties a new media alternative for visibility and information dissemination.
Furthermore, the most relevant explanatory variable of the analysis is parties’ degree of 
centralization. Centralized parties such as PP or semi-centralized parties such as the PSC rank lower 
in engagement than decentralized parties such as CUP and ICV-EUIA. Also, the highly-centralized 
parties – PP and CiU – delete many more comments than the rest. Therefore, the confirmation of 
the third hypothesis implies that the party organization still matters even in times of social media. 
Similar to what Wall & Sudulich (2010) and Padró-Solanet & Cardenal (2008) discovered for the 
parties’ websites, centralization of decisions, high levels of institutionalization and a large size do 
not mean that parties are deploying more participatory or interactive online channels, regardless of 
the resources available to these kinds of parties.
In addition, our research shows that the cleavages pervading the Catalan party system play a role 
in explaining parties’ behaviour on Web 2.0. The results confirming fully the fourth hypothesis and 
partially the fifth hypothesis demonstrate that there are important differences in posting behaviour 
and level of engagement by the cleavage axes. Left-wing parties initiated more posts, get more 
engagement from their followers and delete fewer comments than their right-wing counterparts. Also, 
Catalan-nationalist parties get much more engagement than the non-Catalan-nationalists (with the 
exception of C’s), but post and delete fewer comments (with the exception of CiU). In general, Catalan 
identified parties and left wing parties give rise to more engagement than the rest. As previous studies 
have found, parties’ ideological positions have an influence on their online interaction (Vergeer et al, 
2011; Vaccari, 2013). Left-wing parties usually defend more participatory ideals that lead them to 
develop interactive channels with the citizens, and their followers might be more accustomed to have 
their say (Ibidem). In the current Catalan political scenario dominated by claims for independence, 
Catalan-nationalist parties can also find more commitment and involvement from the citizens in their 
Facebook pages (Bartomeus & Medina, 2010).
Lastly, we have tried to test an alternative explanation to the influence of parties’ characteristics 
in the level of followers’ engagement. We have considered that parties’ communication strategies 
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related to the type of post to be displayed could have an impact. Our results are in line with those 
previously found by Kalsnes (2016) in Norway and show that visual posts (posts with videos or photos) 
trigger more engagement than parties’ posts with links or only text. Precisely, CiU and CUP, which 
enjoy high levels of followers’ engagement, are intensively using photos and videos in their posts.
CONCLUSION
This article has shown that Catalan parties’ characteristics, their posting behaviour and the reactions of 
the followers to the parties’ posts are related. Parties show a diversity of posting activity on Facebook 
and their followers interact and participate differently.
In the Catalan political context, Facebook followers of the small and new parties (for instance, 
CUP or C’s) show a greater engagement with parties’ Facebook posts than those of the big and 
institutionalized parties. Furthermore, highly centralized parties (for example, PP or CiU) exert more 
control over the content of their Facebook pages (by means of deletion of followers’ comments) and 
rank lower in engagement than less centralized and less institutionalized parties (such as CUP). Our 
research also shows the influence of the cleavages of the Catalan party system over the engagement 
of parties’ Facebook followers. Left-wing parties and Catalan-nationalist parties get more engagement 
from their Facebook followers than right-wing parties and non-Catalan-nationalist parties.
This study is a new addition to the understanding of how parties’ characteristics are affecting 
party use of social media and the responses of their possible sympathizers and voters. Most of the 
results are similar to what currently happens in other countries demonstrating that social media have 
an equalization effect since minor, decentralized and new parties are achieving more participation 
than bigger and institutionalized parties.
But could we apply our conclusions and research to other cases? Even if Catalonia is witnessing 
a very specific political climate, parties’ main characteristics and Facebook interaction features are 
comparable across countries. Moreover, the methods and the open software used in this research are 
prone to be replicated in other studies.
Nevertheless, several complementary hypotheses remain to be tested. First, it is reasonable to 
assume that other political parties’ characteristics play a role in explaining parties’ Facebook behaviour. 
For instance, a more in-depth analysis of the party’s primary goals and the corresponding online 
communication strategy (Römmele, 2003) should be conducted. Also, it is relevant to consider the 
perception and decisions of party leaders with regard to the role to be played by social networking sites 
(Lynch & Hogan, 2012) in the parties’ communication strategy and the organization of parties’ social 
media departments (which may be studied by doing in-depth interviews – Kalsnes, 2016). Furthermore, 
it might be useful for explanatory purposes to identify the socio-demographic characteristics of the 
parties’ Facebook followers (by using online surveys) since these characteristics could explain part 
of the differences in participation in parties’ Facebook pages. Lastly, more studies overcoming the 
limited time span of our article and doing comparative analysis between parties of different and similar 
political systems could add powerful insights into the way in which parties deal with social media.
In summary, considering the broader debate on cyberpolitics this research shows that parties’ 
characteristics are affecting Facebook followers’ reactions to parties’ posts. In the present ‘hybrid 
media system’ (Chadwick, 2013), party organization still matters.
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ENdNOTES
1  Social media are web-based services that allow individuals to construct a public or semi-public profile 
within a bounded system, articulate a list of other users with whom they share connections, and view and 
traverse their list of connections and those made by others within the system (Boyd & Ellison, 2008, p. 
2).
2  (a) Big parties: more than 30 seats in the Catalan Parliament; (b) Semi-big parties: 20 to 30 seats; (c) 
Medium parties: 10 to 20 seats; (d) Small parties: 1 to 10 seats.
3  The party’s ideology is measured using the positioning given by the respondents of the CEO survey 
of 20 June, 2013. See Figure 1 to check the joint position of the Catalan parties on the two ideological 
cleavages.
4  We will measure the institutionalization of the parties with a dummy variable: 1. Institutionalized parties: 
parties that have been around for 15 years or more; 2. New parties: parties less than 15 years old.
5  The Tukey and Games-Howell post-hoc tests showed that the posts with photos (M = 2.09, SD = 0.68), 
with videos (M = 1.85, SD = 0.63), with links (M = 1.31, SD = 0.61) and with text (M = 0.73, SD = 
0.95) were significantly different between them. However, the difference between posts with photos and 
the posts with video was less significant (p = 0.011) than the difference between all the other types of 
posts (p = 0.000).
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